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Abstract—The architectures of deployed anonymity systems
such as Tor suffer from two key problems that limit user’s trust
in these systems. First, paths for anonymous communication are
built without considering trust relationships between users and
relays in the system. Second, the network architecture relies on
a set of centralized servers. In this paper, we propose Pisces,
a decentralized protocol for anonymous communications that
leverages users’ social links to build circuits for onion routing.
We argue that such an approach greatly improves the system’s
resilience to attackers.
A fundamental challenge in this setting is the design of a
secure process to discover peers for use in a user’s circuit. All
existing solutions for secure peer discovery leverage structured
topologies and cannot be applied to unstructured social network
topologies. In Pisces, we discover peers by using random walks
in the social network graph with a bias away from highly
connected nodes to prevent a few nodes from dominating
the circuit creation process. To secure the random walks, we
leverage the reciprocal neighbor policy: if malicious nodes try
to exclude honest nodes during peer discovery so as to improve
the chance of being selected, then honest nodes can use a tit-for-
tat approach and reciprocally exclude the malicious nodes from
their routing tables. We describe a fully decentralized protocol
for enforcing this policy, and use it to build the Pisces anonymity
system.
Using theoretical modeling and experiments on real-world
social network topologies, we show that (a) the reciprocal
neighbor policy mitigates active attacks that an adversary
can perform, (b) our decentralized protocol to enforce this
policy is secure and has low overhead, and (c) the overall
anonymity provided by our system significantly outperforms
existing approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
Systems for anonymous communication on the Internet,
or anonymity systems, provide a technical means to en-
hance user privacy by hiding the link between the user
and her remote communicating parties (such as websites
that the user visits). Popular anonymity systems include
Anonymizer.com [8], AN.ON [3], [15], and Tor [13]. Tor
is used by hundreds of thousands of users [55], including
journalists, dissidents, whistle-blowers, law enforcement, and
government embassies [18], [57].
Anonymity systems forward user traffic through a path
(or circuit) of proxy servers. In some systems, including
Tor, the proxies on the circuit are selected from among a
large number of available proxies, each of which is supposed
to be operated by a different person. An attacker, however,
might run a substantial fraction of the proxies under different
identities. He would then be able to deanonymize users whose
circuits run through his attacker-controlled proxies. Thus, the
security of the anonymity system hinges on at least some
of the proxies in the circuit being honest [52]. Having some
means to discern which proxies are likely to be honest would
thereby greatly enhance the security of the system.
Recently, Johnson et al. proposed a method to incorporate
trust—in which the user must judge which proxies are
more likely to be honest—into a Tor-like system [24], [25].
However, their approach relies on central servers, and offers
only limited scalability (see Section II). Both Nagaraja [41]
and Danezis et al. [9] describe a compelling vision for
leveraging social relationships in a decentralized (peer-to-
peer) anonymity system by building circuits over edges
in a social network graph. Unfortunately, their protocols
are limited in applicability to a honest-but-curious attacker
model. Against a more powerful Byzantine adversary, both
approaches are vulnerable to route capture attacks, in which
the entire circuit is comprised of malicious nodes. To our
knowledge, no proposed system securely leverages social
relationship information to improve the chances of attacker-
free circuit construction in a decentralized anonymity system.
Our contributions: In this paper, we propose to use social
networks to help construct circuits that are more robust to
compromise than any prior approach among decentralized
anonymity systems. We take advantage of the fact that,
when protected from manipulation, random walks on social
network topologies are likely to remain among the honest
users [28], [63]. We thus propose to construct random walks
on a social network topology to select circuits in such a way
that they cannot be manipulated by a Byzantine adversary.
We then build circuits from these protected random walks
and show that they provide a very high chance for users to
have an honest circuit, even for users who have a few social
links to malicious peers.
The key challenge in this setting is to prevent the adversary
from biasing the random walk by manipulating their routing
tables. To this end, we propose the reciprocal neighbor
policy: if malicious nodes try to exclude honest nodes
during peer discovery, then honest nodes can use a tit-for-
tat approach and reciprocally exclude the malicious nodes
from their routing tables. The policy ensures that attempts
to bias the random walk towards malicious nodes reduce the
probability of malicious nodes being selected as intermediate
nodes in the random walk, nullifying the effect of the attack.
Further, to prevent an attacker from benefiting by creating a
large clique of malicious peers in the social network, we bias
random walks away from peers with many friends.
An important contribution of our work is a technique
for enforcing the reciprocal neighbor policy in a fully de-
centralized fashion. We efficiently distribute each node’s
current list of contacts (using Whanau [28]) so that those
contacts can verify periodically that they are in the list. A
contact that should be in the list, but is not, can remove the
node permanently from its contacts in future time periods.
Further, the list is signed by the node, so any conflicting lists
for the same time period constitute proof that the node is
cheating. Using this policy, we design Pisces, a decentralized
anonymity system that uses random walks on social networks
to take advantage of users’ trust relationships without being
exposed to circuit manipulation.
We demonstrate through theoretical analysis, simulation,
and experiments, that our application of the reciprocal neigh-
bor policy provides good deterrence against active attacks.
We also show that our distributed design provides robust
enforcement of this policy, with manageable overhead for dis-
tributing and checking contact lists. Finally, using real world
social network topologies, we show that Pisces provides
significantly higher anonymity than existing approaches.
Compared with decentralized approaches that do not leverage
social networks (like ShadowWalker [37]), Pisces provides up
to six bits higher entropy in a single communication round.
Compared with the naive strategy of using conventional ran-
dom walks over social networks (as in the Drac system [9]),
Pisces provides twice the entropy over 100 communication
rounds.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The focus of this work is on low-latency anonymity
systems that can be used for interactive traffic such as
Web browsing and instant messaging. Low-latency anon-
ymity systems aim to defend against a partial adversary
who can compromise or monitor only a fraction of links
in the system. Most of these systems rely on onion routing
[53] for anonymous communication. Onion routing enables
anonymous communication by using a sequence of relays
as intermediate nodes to forward traffic. Such a sequence
of relays is referred to as a circuit. A key property of
onion routing is that each relay on the circuit only sees the
identity of the previous hop and the next hop, but no single
relay can link both the initiator and the destination of the
communication.
A. Centralized/semi-centralized approaches
Most deployed systems for anonymous communication
have a centralized or semi-centralized architecture, includ-
ing Anonymizer [8], AN.ON [15], Tor [13], Freedom [7],
Onion Routing [53], and I2P [22]. Anonymizer.com [8] is
effectively a centralized proxy server with a single point
of control. If the proxy server becomes compromised or
is subject to subpoena, the privacy provided by the system
would be lost. AN.ON [15] distributes the trust among three
independently-operated servers; again, the compromise of
just a few nodes suffices to undermine the entire system. Both
Anonymizer.com and AN.ON are prone to flooding-based
denial of service attacks. Furthermore, with both systems, it
may be possible to eavesdrop on the server(s) and use end-to-
end timing attacks (such as [21], [61], [65]) to substantially
undermine the privacy of all users.
Tor is a widely used anonymous communication system,
serving roughly 500,000 users [56] and carrying terabytes of
traffic each day [55]. Tor is substantially more distributed
than either Anonymizer.com or AN.ON, with users building
circuits from among about 3,000 proxy nodes (onion routers)
as of May 2012 [27]. This helps to protect against direct
attacks and eavesdropping on the entire system. Tor relies on
trusted entities called directory authorities to maintain up-to-
date information about all relays that are online in the form
of a network consensus database. Freedom [7] and I2P [22]
also use such centralized directory servers. Users download
the full database, and then locally select random relays for
anonymous communication. Clients download this database
every three hours to handle relay churn.
Although Tor has a more distributed approach than any
other deployed system, there are several shortcomings with
its architecture. First, Tor does not leverage a user’s trust
relationships for building circuits. In Tor, an attacker could
volunteer a set of proxy nodes under different identities
and then use these nodes to compromise the anonymity of
circuits going through them. Leveraging trust relationships
has been shown to be useful for improving anonymity against
such an attacker in Tor [24], [25]. Second, the trusted
directory authorities are attractive targets for attack; in fact,
some directory authorities were recently found to have been
compromised [1]. Finally, the requirement for all users to
maintain global information about all online relays becomes
a scalability bottleneck. McLachlan et al. [32] showed that
under reasonable growth projections, the Tor network could
be spending more bandwidth to maintain this global system
view than for the core task of relaying anonymous communi-
cations. The recent proposal for PIR-Tor [40] might address
the networking scalability issues, but it does not mitigate
the basic trust and denial of service issues in a centralized
approach.
B. Incorporating social trust
The importance of leveraging social network trust rela-
tionships to improve the security and privacy properties of
systems has been recognized by a large body of previous
work [9]–[11], [24], [25], [28], [29], [39], [41], [58], [63],
[64]. Recently, Johnson et al. proposed a method to incor-
porate trust into a Tor-like system [24], [25]. However, their
approach relies on central servers, and offers only limited
scalability. Nagaraja [41] and Danezis et al. [9] have both
proposed anonymity systems over social networks. However,
both approaches assume an honest-but-curious attack model
and are vulnerable to route capture attacks. In particular,
without the security of the reciprocal neighbor policy used
in Pisces, a random walk on the social graph that goes to an
attacker-controlled peer at any step can be controlled by the
attacker for the remainder of the walk.
Designing anonymity systems that are aware of users’ trust
relationships is an important step towards defending against
the Sybil attack [14], in which a single entity in the network
(the attacker) can emulate the behavior of multiple identities
and violate security properties of the system. Mechanisms
like SybilGuard [64], SybilLimit [63], and SybilInfer [11]
aim to leverage social network trust relationships to bound the
number of Sybil identities any malicious entity can emulate.
These mechanisms are based on the observation that it is
costly for an adversary to form trust relationships (also known
as attack edges) with honest nodes. When the adversary
performs a Sybil attack, he can create an arbitrary number
of edges between Sybil identities and malicious entities, but
cannot create trust relationships between Sybil identities and
honest users. Thus, a Sybil attack in social networks creates
two regions in the social network graph, the honest region
and the Sybil region, with relatively few edges between them;
i.e., the graph features a small cut. This cut can be used to
detect and mitigate the Sybil attack.
Recent work has challenged the assumption that it is costly
for an attacker to create attack edges with honest nodes in
friendship graphs [4], [6], [23], [62], and proposed the use
of interaction graphs as a more secure realization of real
world social trust. In this work, we will evaluate Pisces
with both friendship graphs as well as topologies based on
interaction graphs. Other mechanisms to infer the strength
of ties between users [17] may also be helpful in creating
resilient social graphs, but these are not the focus of this
paper.
C. Decentralized and peer-to-peer approaches
A number of distributed directory services for anonymous
communication have been designed using a P2P approach;
most have serious problems that prevent them from being
deployed. We point out these issues briefly here. First we note
that the well-known Crowds system, which was the first P2P
anonymity system, uses a centralized directory service [45]
and thus is not fully P2P. The Tarzan system proposes a
gossip-based distributed directory service that does not scale
well beyond 10,000 nodes [16].
MorphMix was the first scalable P2P anonymity sys-
tem [46]. It uses random walks on unstructured topologies
for circuit construction and employs a witness scheme that
aims to detect routing table manipulation. The detection
mechanism can be bypassed by an attacker who is careful in
his choices of fake routing tables [54]. With or without the
evasion technique, the attacker can manipulate routing tables
to capture a substantial fraction of circuits. Despite over
a decade of research, decentralized mechanisms to secure
random walks in unstructured topologies have been an open
problem. Pisces overcomes this problem by having peers
sign their routing tables for a given time slot and ensuring
that nodes observe enough copies to detect cheaters quickly,
before many route captures can occur, and with certainty.
Recently, several protocols have been proposed using P2P
systems built on distributed hash tables (DHTs), includ-
ing AP3 [35], Salsa [42], NISAN [43], and Torsk [32].
These four protocols are vulnerable to information leak
attacks [36], [60], as the lookup process and circuit con-
struction techniques expose information about the requesting
peer’s circuits. These attacks can lead to users being partially
or completely deanonymized. ShadowWalker, which is also
based on a structured topology, employs random walks on
the DHT topology for circuit construction [37]. The routing
tables are checked and signed by shadow nodes such that
both a node in the random walk and all of its shadows
would need to be attackers for a route capture attack to
succeed. The protocol was found to be partially broken, but
then also fixed, by Schuchard et al. [48]. Despite it not
being seriously vulnerable to attacks as found against other
protocols, ShadowWalker remains vulnerable to a small but
non-trivial fraction of route captures (roughly the same as
Tor for reasonable parameters). As we show in Section IV,
Pisces’s use of social trust means that it can outperform
ShadowWalker (and Tor) for route captures when the attacker
has a bounded number of attack edges in the social network.
Other than these approaches, Mittal et al. [38] briefly
considered the use of the reciprocal neighbor policy for
anonymous communication. However, their protocol is only
applicable to constant degree topologies, and utilizes central
points of trust. Moreover, their evaluation was very pre-
liminary. In this paper, we present a complete design for
a decentralized anonymity system based on the reciprocal
neighbor policy. Since our design is not limited to constant
degree topologies, we explore the advantages that come from
applying the technique to unstructured social network graphs.
We also present the first fully decentralized protocols for
achieving these policies and present analysis, simulation,
and experimentation results demonstrating the security and
performance properties of the Pisces approach.
III. PISCES PROTOCOL
In this section, we first describe our design goals, threat
model, and system model. We then outline the core problem
of securing random walks and describe the role of the
reciprocal neighbor policy in solving the problem in the
context of social networks. Finally, we explain how Pisces
securely implements this policy.
A. Design goals
We now present our key design goals for our system.
1. Trustworthy anonymity: we target an architecture that is
able to leverage a user’s social trust relationships to improve
the security of anonymous communication. Current mecha-
nisms for incorporating social trust are either centralized or
are limited in applicability to an honest-but-curious attacker
model.
2. Decentralized design: the design should not have any
central entities. Central entities are attractive targets for
attackers, in addition to being a single point of failure for the
entire system. The design should also mitigate route capture
and information leak attacks.
3. Scalable anonymity: the design should be able to scale
to millions of users and relays with low communication
overhead. Since anonymity is defined as the state of being
unidentifiable in a group [44], architectures that can support
millions of users provide the additional benefit of increasing
the overall anonymity of users.
B. Threat model
In this work, we consider a colluding adversary who
can launch Byzantine attacks against the anonymity system.
The adversary can perform passive attacks such as logging
information for end-to-end timing analysis [30], as well
as active attacks such as deviating from the protocol and
selectively denying service to some circuits [5]. We assume
the existence of effective mechanisms to defend against the
Sybil attack, such as those based on social networks [11],
[63]. Existing Sybil defense mechanisms are not perfect and
allow the insertion of a bounded number of Sybil identities
in the system. They also require the number of attack edges
to be bounded by g = O( hlog h), where h is the number of
honest nodes in the system. We use this as our primary threat
model. For comparative analysis, we also evaluate our system
under an ideal Sybil defense that does not allow the insertion
of any Sybil identities.
C. System Model and Assumptions
Pisces is a fully decentralized protocol and does not
assume any PKI infrastructure. Each node generates a local
public-private key pair. An identity in the system equates
to its public key. Existing Sybil defense mechanisms can
be used to validate node identities. We assume that the
identities in the system can be blacklisted; i.e., an adversary
node cannot whitewash its identity by rejoining the system
with a different public key. This is a reasonable assumption,
since (a) mechanisms such as SybilInfer/SybilLimit only
allow the insertion of a bounded number of Sybil identities,
and (b) replacing deleted attack edges is expensive for the
attacker, particularly in a social network graph based on
interactions. We assume loose time synchronization amongst
nodes. Existing services such as NTP [34] can provide time
synchronization on the order of hundreds of milliseconds in
wide area networks [20].
Finally, in this work, we will leverage mechanisms for
building efficient communication structures over unstructured
social networks, such as Whanau [28] and X-Vine [39].
These mechanisms embed a structure into social network
topologies to provide a distributed hash table for efficient
communication [47], [51]. In particular, we use Whanau,
since it provides the best security guarantees amongst the
current state of art. Whanau guarantees that, with high prob-
ability, it is possible to securely look up any object present
in the DHT. It is important to point out that Whanau only
provides availability, but not integrity [28]. This means that if
a user performs redundant lookups for a single key, multiple
conflicting results may be returned; Whanau guarantees that
the correct result will be included in the returned set, but
leaves the problem of identifying which result is correct to
the application layer. Therefore, Whanau cannot be used in
conjunction with current protocols that provide anonymous
communication using structured topologies [37], since these
protocols require integrity guarantees from the DHT layer
itself. We emphasize that the only property we assume
from Whanau is secure routing; in particular, we do not
assume any privacy or anonymity properties in its lookup
mechanisms [36], [60].
D. Problem Overview
Random walks are an integral part of many distributed
anonymity systems, from Tor [13] to ShadowWalker [37]. In
a random walk based circuit construction, an initiator I of the
random walk first selects a random node A from its neighbors
in some topology (in our case, the social network graph). The
initiator sets up a single-hop circuit with node A and uses the
circuit to download a list of node A’s neighbors (containing
the IP addresses and public keys of neighbors). Node I can
then select a random node B from the downloaded list of
node A’s neighbors and extend the circuit through A onto
node B. This process can be repeated to set up a circuit of
length l.
Random walks are vulnerable to active route capture
attacks in which an adversary biases the peer discovery
process towards colluding malicious nodes. First, malicious
nodes can exclude honest nodes from their neighbor list to
bias the peer discovery process. Second, malicious nodes can
modify the public keys of honest nodes in their neighbor list.
When a initiator of the random walk extends a circuit from a
malicious node to a neighboring honest node, the malicious
node can simply emulate the honest neighbor. The malicious
node can repeat this process for further circuit extensions
as well. Finally, the malicious nodes can add more edges
between each other in the social network topology to increase
the percentage of malicious nodes in their neighbor lists. To
secure the random walk process, we use a reciprocal neighbor
policy that limits the benefit to the attacker of attempting to
bias the random walks. We propose a protocol that securely
realizes this policy through detection of violations.
E. Reciprocal Neighbor Policy
We now discuss the key primitive we leverage for securing
random walks, the reciprocal neighbor policy. The main
idea of this policy is to consider undirected versions of
structured or unstructured topologies and then entangle the
routing tables of neighboring nodes with each other. In other
words, if a malicious node X does not correctly advertise an
honest node Y in its neighbor list, then Y also excludes X
from its neighbor list in a tit-for-tat manner. The reciprocal
neighbor policy ensures that route capture attacks based on
incorrect advertisement of honest nodes during random walks
serves to partially isolate malicious nodes behind a small cut
in the topology, reducing the probability that they will be
selected in a random walk. In particular, this policy mitigates
the first two types of route capture attacks described above,
namely the exclusion of honest nodes and the modification
of honest nodes’ public keys. However, the adversary can
still bias the peer discovery process by simply inserting
a large number of malicious nodes to its routing tables.
Thus, the reciprocal neighbor policy described so far would
only be effective for topologies in which node degrees are
bounded and homogeneous, such as structured peer-to-peer
topologies like Chord [51] and Pastry [47]. However, node
degrees in unstructured social network topologies are highly
heterogeneous, presenting an avenue for attack.
Handling the node degree attack: Addition of edges
amongst colluding malicious nodes in a topology increases
the probability that a malicious node is selected in a random
walk. To prevent this node degree attack, we propose to
perform random walks using the Metropolis-Hastings modifi-
cation [19], [33] — the transition matrix used for our random
walks is as follows:
Pij =


min( 1
di
, 1
dj
) if i→ j is an edge in G
1−
∑
k 6=i Pik if j = i
0 otherwise
(1)
where di denotes the degree of vertex i in G. Since the
transition probabilities to neighbors may not always sum to
one, nodes add a self loop to the transition probabilities to
address this. The Metropolis-Hastings modification ensures
that attempts to add malicious nodes in the neighbor table
decreases the probability of malicious nodes being selected
in a random walk. We will show that the Metropolis-Hastings
modification along with reciprocal neighbor policy is surpris-
ingly effective at mitigating active attacks on random walks.
A malicious node’s attempts to bias the random walk process
by launching route capture attacks reduce its own probability
of getting selected as an intermediate node in future random
walks, nullifying the effect of the attack.
F. Securing Reciprocal Neighbor Policy
We now present our protocol for securely implementing
the reciprocal neighbor policy.
Intuition: Our key idea is to have neighbors periodically
check each other’s neighbor lists. Suppose that node X and
node Y are neighbors. If node X’s neighbor list doesn’t
include node Y , then the periodic check will reveal this and
enable node Y to implement the tit-for-tat removal of node X
from its routing table. Additionally, the neighbor lists can be
signed by each node so that a dishonest node can be caught
with two different, signed lists and blacklisted. To handle
churn, we propose that all nodes keep their neighbor lists
static for the duration of a regular interval (t) and update the
list with joins and leaves only between intervals. Here we rely
on our assumption of loose time synchronization. The use of
static neighbor lists ensures that we can identify conflicting
neighbor lists from a node for the same time interval, which
would be a clear indication of malicious behavior. The
duration of the time interval for which the lists remain
static determines the trade-off between the communication
overhead for securing the reciprocal neighborhood policy and
the unreliability of circuit construction due to churn.
Setting up static neighbor list certificates: A short time
prior to the beginning of a new time interval, each node sets
up a new neighbor list that it will use in the next time interval:
1) Liveness check: In the first round, nodes exchange mes-
sages with their trusted neighbors to check for liveness
and reciprocal trust. A reciprocal exchange of messages
ensures that both neighbors are interested in advertising
each other in the next time interval (and are not in
each other’s local blacklists). Nodes wait for a time
duration to receive these messages from all neighbors,
and after the timeout, construct a preliminary version
of their next neighbor list, comprising node identities
of all nodes that responded in the first communication
round.
2) Degree exchange: Next, the nodes broadcast the length
of their preliminary neighbor list to all the neighbors.
This step is important since Metropolis-Hastings ran-
dom walks require node degrees of neighboring nodes
to determine their transition probabilities.
3) Final list: After receiving these broadcasts from all
the neighbors, a node creates a final neighbor list and
digitally signs it with its private key. The final list
includes the IP address, public key, and node degree
of each neighbor, as well as the time interval for the
validity of the list. Note that a neighbor may go offline
between the first and second step, before the node has
a chance to learn its node degree, in which case it can
simply be omitted from the final list.
4) Local integrity checks: At the beginning of every new
time interval, each node queries all its neighbors and
downloads their signed neighbor lists. When a node
A receives a neighbor list from B, it performs local
integrity checks, verifying that B’s neighbor entry for
A contains the correct IP address, public key, and node
degree. Additionally, it verifies that the length of the
neighbor list is at most as long as was broadcast in
Phase 2. (Note that intentionally broadcasting a higher
node degree is disadvantageous to a B, as it will
reduce the transition probability of it being chosen by
a random walk). If any local integrity checks fails, A
places B in its permanent local blacklist, severing its
social trust relationship with B and refusing all further
communication. If all the checks succeed, then these
neighbor lists serve as a cryptographic commitment
from these nodes–the presence of any conflicting neigh-
bor lists for the same time interval issued by the same
node is clear evidence of misbehavior.
If B’s neighbor list omits A entirely, or if B simply
refuses to send its neighbor list to A, B is placed
on a temporary blacklist, and A will refuse further
communication with B for the duration of the cur-
rent time period, preventing any circuits from being
extended from A to B. (Effectively, A performs a
selective denial-of-service against B; see Section IV-C
for more discussion of this.) The blacklist only lasts for
the duration of the current round, since the omission
could have resulted from a temporary communication
failure.
Duplicate detection: Next, we need to ensure that B uses
the same neighbor list during random walks as it presented
to its neighbors. Our approach is to use the Whanau DHT
to check for the presence of several conflicting neighbor
lists signed by the same node for the same time period.
After performing the local checks, A will store a copy of
B’s signed neighbor list in the Whanau, using B’s identity
(namely, its public key) as the DHT key. Then, when another
node C performs a random walk that passes through B, it will
receive a signed neighbor list from B. It will then perform a
lookup in the DHT for any stored neighbor lists under B’s
key. If it discovers a different list for the same period with
a valid signature, then it can notify B’s neighbors about the
misbehavior, causing them to immediately blacklist B.
One challenge is that the Whanau lookups are not anony-
mous and may reveal to external observers the fact that C
is performing a random walk through B. This information
leak, linking C and B, can then be used to break C’s
anonymity [36], [60]. To address this problem, we introduce
the concept of testing random walks that are not actually
used for anonymous communication but are otherwise indis-
tinguishable from regular random walks. Whanau lookups
to check for misbehavior are performed for testing random
walks only, since information leaks in that case will not
reveal private information. The lookups are performed after
the random walk to ensure that testing walks and the regular
walks cannot be distinguished. If each node performs a small
number of testing walks within a each time period, any
misbehavior will be detected with high probability.
Blacklisting: When C detects a conflicting neighbor list
issued by B, it immediately notifies all of B’s neighbors
(as listed in the neighbor list stored in the DHT), presenting
the two lists as evidence of misbehavior. B’s neighbors will
thereafter terminate their social relationships with B, black-
listing it. Note, however, that the two conflicting lists form
incontrovertible evidence that B was behaving maliciously,
since honest nodes never issue two neighbor lists in a single
time interval. This evidence can be broadcast globally to
ensure that all nodes blacklist B, as any node can verify
the signatures on the two lists, and thus B will not be able
to form connections with any honest nodes in the system.
Moreover, honest nodes will know not to select B in any
random walk, effectively removing it from the social graph
entirely.
Proactive vs. reactive security: Our system relies on
detecting malicious behavior and blacklisting nodes. Thus,
as described so far, Pisces provides reactive security. To
further strengthen random walk security in the scenario when
the adversary is performing route capture for the first time,
we propose an extension to Pisces that aims to provide
proactive security. We propose a discover but wait strategy, in
which users build circuits for anonymous communication, but
impose a delay between building a circuit and actually using
it for anonymous communication. If misbehavior is detected
by a testing random walk within the delay period, the circuit
will be terminated as B’s neighbors blacklist it; otherwise, if
a circuit survives some timeout duration, then it can be used
for anonymous communication.
Performance optimization: Using all hops of a random
walk for anonymous communication has significant perfor-
mance limitations. First, the latency experienced by the user
scales linearly with the random walk length. Second, long
circuit lengths reduce the overall throughput that a system
can offer to a user. Inspired by prior work [37], we propose
the following performance optimization. Instead of using all
hops of a random walk for anonymous communication, the
initiator can use the random walk as a peer discovery process,
and leverage the kth hop and the last hop to build a two-
hop circuit for anonymous communication. In our evaluation,
we find that values of k that are close to half the random
walk length provide a good trade-off between anonymity and
performance.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate Pisces with theoretical anal-
ysis as well as experiments using real-world social network
topologies. In particular, we (a) show the security benefits
provided by the reciprocal neighbor policy, (b) evaluate the
security, performance, and overhead of our protocol that
implements the policy, and (c) evaluate the overall anony-
mity provided by Pisces. We consider four datasets for our
experiments, which were processed in a manner similar to
the evaluation done in SybilLimit [63] and SybilInfer [11]:
(i) a Facebook friendship graph from the New Orleans
regional network [59], containing 50,150 nodes and 772,843
edges; (ii) a Facebook wall post interaction graph from
the New Orleans regional network [59], containing 29,140
users and 161,969 edges; (iii) a Facebook interaction graph
from a moderate-sized regional network [62], containing
about 380,564 nodes and about 3.24 million edges; (iv) a
Facebook friendship graph from a moderate-sized regional
network [62], containing 1,033,805 nodes and about 13.7
million edges.
A. Reciprocal Neighbor Policy
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the reciprocal neighbor
policy for implementing trust-based anonymity, let us assume
for now that there is a mechanism to securely achieve the
policy, i.e., that if a node X does not advertise a node Y in
its neighborlist, then Y also excludes X . In this scenario, we
are interested in characterizing the probability distribution of
random walks.
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P
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Fig. 3. Attack Model.
Theorem 1: Node degree attack: Given h honest nodes
and m malicious nodes (including Sybil nodes) that have
g edges (attack edges) amongst each other in an undirected
and connected social network, the stationary probability of
random walks starting at an honest node and terminating at
a malicious node cannot be biased by adding edges amongst
malicious nodes. Moreover, this stationary probability is
independent of the topology created amongst malicious nodes
(as long as the social graph is connected).
Proof: Let us denote pii as the stationary probability
of random walks (independent of the initial state of the
random walk) for node i, and let Pij denote the transition
probability from node i to node j. Let n denote the total
number of nodes in the social network (n = h +m). Since
the transition probabilities between nodes in the Metropolis-
Hastings random walks are symmetric (Pij = Pji =
min
(
1
degree(i) ,
1
degree(j)
)
), observe that ∀z, piz = 1n is solu-
tion to the equation pii ·Pij = pij ·Pji. Since social networks
are non-bipartite as well as undirected graphs, the solution
to the above equation (pi = 1
n
) must be the unique stationary
distribution for the random walk [2]. Thus the stationary
probability of random walks terminating at any node in the
system is uniform and independent of the number of edges
amongst malicious nodes, or the topology amongst malicious
nodes in the system (as long as the graph remains connected).
We validate Theorem 1 using simulation results on the
Facebook wall post interaction graph. Figure 1(a) depicts
the probability of a Pisces random walk terminating at a
malicious node as a function of random walk length for
g = 30000 (2900 malicious nodes) and g = 60000 (7300
malicious nodes). We can see that the random walk quickly
reaches its stationary distribution, and at the stationary distri-
bution, the probability of a random walk terminating at one
of the malicious nodes is 0.1 and 0.25 respectively (which
is the adversary’s fair share). Figure 1(b) and (c) depict
the probability of a random walk terminating at one of the
malicious nodes under the node degree attack, for g = 30000
and g = 60000 respectively. We can see that adding edges
amongst malicious nodes does not help the adversary (even
for transient length random walks).
Theorem 2: Global blacklisting: suppose that x ≤ m
malicious nodes sacrifice y1 ≤ g attack edges, and that
these malicious nodes originally had y2 ≤ g attack edges.
The stationary probability of random walk terminating at
malicious nodes gets reduced proportional to x. The transient
distribution of random walks terminating at malicious nodes
is reduced as a function of y2.
Proof: If x malicious nodes perform the route capture
attack and are globally blacklisted, these nodes become
disconnected from the social trust graph. It follows from our
analysis of Theorem 1 that the stationary distribution of the
random walk is uniform for all connected nodes in the graph.
Thus, the stationary distribution of random walks terminating
at malicious nodes gets reduced from m
m+h to
m−x
m−x+h .
To characterize the transient distribution of the random
walk, we model the process as a Markov chain. Let us denote
the honest set of nodes by H , and the set of malicious nodes
by M . The probability of an l hop random walk ending in
the malicious region (P (l)) is given by:
P (l) = P (l − 1) · PMM + (1− P (l − 1)) · PHM (2)
The terminating condition for the recursion is P (0) = 1,
which reflects that the initiator is honest. We can estimate the
probabilities PHM and PMH as the forward and backward
conductance [26] between the honest and the malicious
nodes, denoted by φF and φB respectively. Thus we have
that:
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 1. Probability of the l’th hop being compromised (Sampling Bias), under an increasing node degree attack [Facebook wall post graph] (a) Without
attack (b) g=30000 attack edges, (c) g=60000 attack edges. For short random walks, this is a losing strategy for the adversary. For longer random walks,
the adversary does not gain any advantage.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 2. Probability of l’th hop being compromised (Sampling Bias) under route capture attack with global blacklisting [Facebook wall post graph] (a)
l = 1, (b) l = 5, (c) l = 25 . As more edges to the honest nodes are removed, the attacker’s loss is higher.
P (l) = P (l − 1) · (1 − φB) + (1− P (l − 1)) · φF
= P (l − 1) · (1 − φB − φF ) + φF (3)
P (l) = φF · [1 + (1− φB − φF ) + (1 − φB − φF )
2
. . .+ (1− φB − φF )
l−1] (4)
We note that if an adversary connects a chain of Sybils
(say of degree 2) to an attack edge, a random walk starting
from an honest node and traversing the attack edge to enter
the malicious region has a non-trivial probability of coming
back to the honest region - via the attack edge (Pisces allows
backward transition along edges). Our analysis models the
probability of returning to the honest region using the notion
of backward conductance.
With g edges between honest and malicious nodes, we can
estimate the forward conductance φF as follows:
φF =
Σx∈HΣy∈Mpix · Pxy
piH
=
Σx∈HΣy∈M · Pxy
|H |
= O
( g
h
)
(5)
Similarly, with g edges between honest and malicious
nodes, the backward conductance φB is estimated as:
φB =
φF · |H |
|M |
=
O( g
h
) · h
m
= O
( g
m
)
(6)
Thus, we have that φF = O( gh ), and φB = O(
g
m
). If
malicious nodes exclude y edges to honest nodes from their
fingertables, application of the RNP ensures that the honest
nodes also exclude the y edges from their fingertables (local
blacklisting). Thus, route capture attacks result in deleting
of attack edges which reduces both forward and backward
transition probabilities. Observe that the probability of the
first hop being in the malicious region is equal to φF ,
which gets reduced under attack. We will now show this
for a general value of l. Following Equation 4 and using
Σi=mi=0 x
i = 1−x
m+1
1−x for 0 < x < 1, we have that:
P (l) =
φF · (1− (1− φB − φF )
l)
1− (1 − φB − φF )
=
φF
φF + φB
· (1− (1− φB + φF )
l) (7)
Using φB = hm · φF , we have that:
P (l) =
m
n
· (1 − (1− φB + φF )
l)
P (l) =
m
n
·
(
1−
(
1−
n
m
· φF
)l)
(8)
Differentiating P (l) with respect to φF , we have that:
d
dφF
(P (l)) =
m
n
·
(
l ·
(
1−
n
m
· φF
)l−1)
(9)
Note that (1− n
m
φF ) = (1− φB − φF ) ≥ 0. This implies
d
dφF
P (l) ≥ 0. Thus, P (l) is an increasing function of φF ,
Fig. 4. Probability of end-to-end timing analysis under route capture attack
with global blacklisting [Facebook wall graph]
and since the reduction of the number of attack edges reduces
φF , it also leads to a reduction in the transient distribution
of the random walk terminating at malicious nodes. Thus, it
follows that a reduction in the number of remaining attack
edges y2 reduces the transient distribution of random walks
terminating at malicious nodes.
Figure 2 depicts the probability of random walks ter-
minating at malicious nodes as a function of number of
attack edges as well as the fraction of deleted edges when
honest nodes use a global blacklisting policy. We can see that
sacrificing attack edges so as to perform route capture attacks
is a losing strategy for the attacker. Moreover, the decrease
is similar for all random walk lengths; this is because even
the stationary distribution of the random walk terminating at
malicious nodes is reduced.
Anonymity Implication: To de-anonymize the user with-
out the help of the destination node (e.g. the website to which
the user connects anonymously), both the first hop and the
last hop of the random walk need to be malicious to observe
the connecting user and her destinations, respectively. End-
to-end timing analysis [21], [61] makes it so that controlling
these two nodes is sufficient for de-anonymization. Figure 4
depicts the probability of such an attack being successful as
a function of the number of attack edges and the fraction of
deleted edges using the global blacklisting policy. We can
see that the probability of attack is a decreasing function of
the fraction of deleted edges.Thus we conclude that route
capture attacks are a losing strategy against our approach.
So far, we validated our analysis using simulations assum-
ing an an ideal Sybil defense. We also validated our analysis
using a more realistic Sybil defense that permits a bounded
number (set to 10 [63]) of Sybils per attack edge, which we
show in Figure 5.
B. Securing Reciprocal Neighborhood Policy
We now discuss the security and performance of our
protocol that implements the reciprocal neighbor policy.
Security proof sketch: Suppose that a malicious node A
aims to exclude an honest node B from its neighborlist.
To pass node B’s local integrity checks, node A has to
return a neighborlist to node B that correctly advertises
node B. Since random walks for anonymous communication
are indistinguishable from testing random walks, there is
Fig. 5. Probability of end-to-end timing analysis under route capture attack
with global blacklisting using 10 Sybils per attack edge [Facebook wall
graph]
Fig. 6. Probability of detecting a route capture [Facebook wall post
interaction graph]. The attack model includes 10 Sybils per attack edge.
a probability that the adversary will advertise a conflicting
neighbor list that does not include node B to an initiator of
the testing random walk. The initiator of the testing random
walk will insert the malicious neighbor list into the Whanau
DHT, and node B can perform a robust lookup for node A’s
key to obtain the conflicting neighbor list. Since Whanau only
provides availability, node B can check for integrity of the
results by verifying node A’s signature. Since honest nodes
never advertise two conflicting lists within a time interval,
node B can infer that node A is malicious.
Performance Evaluation: We analyze the number of test-
ing random walks that each node must perform to achieve a
high probability of detecting a malicious node that attempts to
perform a route capture attack. Nodes must perform enough
testing walks such that a high percentage of compromised
nodes (which are connected to honest nodes) have been
probed in a single time slot. First, we consider a defense
strategy where honest nodes only insert the terminal hop of
the testing random walks in Whanau (Strategy 1). Intuitively,
from the coupon collectors problem, logn walks per node
should suffice to catch a malicious node with high probability.
Indeed, from Figure 6, we can see that six testing walks per
time interval suffice to catch a malicious node performing
route capture attacks with high probability. The honest nodes
can also utilize all hops of the testing random walks to check
for conflicts (Strategy 2), in which case only two or three
testing walks are required per time interval (at the cost of
increased communication overhead for the DHT operations).
Next, we address the question of how to choose the
duration of the time interval (t). The duration of the time slot
Fig. 7. Unreliability in circuit construction [Facebook wall post interaction
graph].
Fig. 8. Circuit build times in Tor as a function of circuit length
governs the trade-off between communication overhead and
reliability of circuit construction. A large value of the time
slot interval results in a smaller communication overhead
but higher unreliability in circuit construction, since nodes
selected in the random walk are less likely to still be online.
On the other hand, a smaller value of the time interval
provides higher reliability in higher circuit construction at
the cost of increased communication overhead, since a fixed
number of testing walks must be performed within the
duration of the time slot. We can see this trade-off in Figure 7.
We consider two churn models for our analysis: (a) nodes
have a mean lifetime of 24 hours (reflecting behavior of Tor
relays [27] ), and (b) nodes have a mean lifetime of 1 hour
(reflecting behavior of conventional P2P networks). For the
two scenarios, using a time slot duration of 3 hours and one
of 5 minutes, respectively, results in a 2-3% probability of
getting an unreliable random walk for up to 25 hops.
Overhead: There are three main sources of communica-
tion overhead in our system. First is the overhead due to
setting up the neighbor lists; which requires about d2 KB
of communication, where d is the node degree. The second
source of overhead is the testing random walks, where nodes
are required to perform about six such walks of length 25.
The third source of overhead comes from participation in the
Whanau DHT. Typically, key churn is a significant source
of overhead in Whanau, requiring all of its routing tables
to be rebuilt. However, in our scenario, only the values
corresponding to the keys change quickly, but not the keys
themselves, requiring only a modest amount of heartbeat
traffic [28]. Considering the Facebook wall post topology,
we estimate the mean communication overhead per node per
time interval to be only about 6 MB. We also evaluate the
latency of constructing long onion routing circuits through
experiments over the live Tor network. We used the Torflow
utility to build Tor circuits with varying circuit lengths;
Figure 8 depicts our experimental results. Using these results,
we estimate that 25 hop circuits would take about 1 minute
to construct.
C. Anonymity
Earlier, we considered the probability of end-to-end timing
analysis as our metric for anonymity. This metric considers
the scenario where the adversary has exactly de-anonymized
the user. However, in random walk based anonymous com-
munication, the adversary may sometimes have probabilistic
knowledge of the initiator. To quantify all possible sources
of information leaks, we now use the entropy metric to
quantify anonymity [12], [49]. The entropy metric considers
the probability distribution of nodes being possible initiators,
as computed by the attackers. In this paper, we will restrict
our analysis to Shannon entropy, since it is the most widely
used mechanism for analyzing anonymity. There are other
ways of computing entropy, such as guessing entropy [31]
and min entropy [50], which we will consider in the full
version of this work. Shannon entropy is computed as:
H(I) =
i=n∑
i=0
−pi · log2(pi) (10)
where pi is the probability assigned to node i of being the
initiator of a circuit. Given a particular observation o, the
adversary can first compute the probability distribution of
nodes being potential initiators of circuits pi|o and then the
corresponding conditional entropy H(I|o). We can model the
entropy distribution of the system as a whole by considering
the weighted average of entropy for each possible observa-
tion, including the null observation.
H(I|O) =
∑
o∈O
P (o) ·H(I|o) (11)
We first consider the scenario where an initiator performs
an l-hop random walk to communicate with a malicious
destination, and the nodes in the random walk are all honest,
i.e., the adversary is external to the system. For this scenario,
we will analyze the expected initiator anonymity under the
conservative assumption that the adversary has complete
knowledge of the entire social network graph.
Malicious destination: A naive way to compute initiator
entropy for this scenario is to consider the set of nodes
that are reachable from the terminus of the random walk
in exactly l hops (the adversary’s observation), and assign
a uniform probability to all nodes in that set of being
potential initiators. However, such an approach does not
consider the mixing characteristics of the random walk; l
hop random walks starting at different nodes may in fact
have heterogeneous probabilities of terminating at a given
node.
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e)
Fig. 9. Expected entropy as a function of random walk length using (a) Facebook wall post graph (b) Facebook link graph (c) Anonymous Interaction
graph (d) Anonymous link graph and (e) CDF of entropy for Facebook wall graph and malicious destination.
We now outline a strategy that explicitly considers the
mixing characteristics of the trust topology. Let the terminus
of an l hop random walk be node j. The goal of the adversary
is to compute probabilities pi of a particular node being the
initiator of the circuit:
pi =
P lij∑
x P
l
xj
(12)
where P l denotes the l-hop transition matrix for the random
walk process. Note that even for moderate size social graphs,
the explicit computation of P l is infeasible in terms of
both memory and computational constraints. This is because
even though P is a sparse matrix, iterative multiplication
of P by itself results in a matrix that is no longer sparse.
To make the problem feasible, we propose to leverage the
time reversibility of our random walk process. We have
previously modeled the random walk process as a Markov
chain (Theorem 2 in Appendix). Markov chains that satisfy
the following property are known as time-reversible Markov
chains [2].
pii · Pij = pij · Pji (13)
Both the conventional random walk and the Metropolis-
Hastings random walk satisfy the above property and are
thus time-reversible Markov chains. It follows from time
reversibility [2], that:
pii · P
l
ij = pij · P
l
ji =⇒ P
l
ij =
pij
pii
· P lji (14)
Thus it is possible to compute P lij using P lji. Let Vj be
the initial probability vector starting at node j. Then the
probability of an l hop random walk starting at node j and
ending at node i can be computed as the i’th element of the
vector Vj ·P l. Observe that Vj ·P l can be computed without
computing the matrix P l:
Vj · P
l = (Vj · P ) · P
l−1 (15)
Since P is a sparse matrix, Vj · P can be computed in
O(n) time, and Vj · P l can be computed in O(nl) time.
Finally, we can compute the probabilities of nodes being
potential initiators of circuits using equation (12), and the
corresponding entropy gives us the initiator anonymity. We
average the resulting entropy over 100 randomly chosen
terminal nodes j to compute the expected anonymity.
Figure 9(a)-(d) depicts the expected initiator anonymity
as a function of random walk length for different social
network topologies. We can see that longer random walks
result in an increase in anonymity. This is because for short
random walks of length l in restricted topologies such as
trust networks, not every node can reach the terminus of
the random walk in l hops. Secondly, even for nodes that
can reach the terminus of the random walk in l hops, the
probabilities of such a scenario happening can be highly
heterogeneous. Further more, we can see that conventional
random walks converge to optimal entropy in about 10 hops
for all four topologies. In contrast, the Metropolis-Hastings
random walks used in Pisces take longer to converge. This
is because random walks in Pisces have slower mixing
properties than conventional random walks. However, we can
see that even the Metropolis-Hastings random walk starts to
converge after 25 hops in all scenarios.
To get an understanding of the distribution of the entropy,
we plot the CDF of entropy over 100 random walk samples in
Figure 9(e). We can see that the typical anonymity offered by
moderately long random walks is high. For example, using a
Metropolis-Hastings random walk of length 25, 95% of users
get an entropy of at least 11 bits. So far, we observed that
Metropolis-Hastings random walks need to be longer than
conventional random walks for equivalent level of anonymity
against a malicious destination. Next, we will see the benefit
of using Metropolis-Hastings random walks in Pisces, since
they can be secured against insider attacks.
Insider adversary: We now analyze the anonymity of
the system with respect to an insider adversary (malicious
participants).We first consider an adversary that has g attack
edges going to honest nodes, with g = O( hlog h), and 10
Sybils per attack edge [63]. When both the first and the
last hop of a random walk are compromised, then initiator
entropy is 0 due to end-to-end timing analysis. Let Mi be
the event where the first compromised node is at the ith
hop and the last hop is also compromised. Suppose that
the previous hop of the first compromised node is node A.
Under this scenario, the adversary can localize the initiator
to the set of nodes that can reach the node A in i− 1 hops.
If we denote the initiator anonymity under this scenario as
H(I|Mi), then from equation (11), it follows that the overall
system anonymity is:
H(I|O) =
i=l∑
i=1
P (Mi) ·H(I|Mi) + (1−
i=l∑
i=1
P (Mi)) · log2 n
(16)
We compute P (Mi) using simulations, and H(I|Mi), us-
ing the expected anonymity computations discussed above.
Figure 10(a) depicts the expected entropy as a function of
the number of attack edges. We find that Pisces provides
close to optimal anonymity. Moreover, as the length of the
random walk increases, the anonymity does not degrade. In
contrast, without any defense, the anonymity decreases with
an increase in the random walk length (not shown in the
figure), since at every step in the random walk, there is a
chance of the random walk being captured by the adversary.
At g = 3000, the anonymity provided by a conventional 10-
hop random walk without any defenses (used in systems such
as Drac and Whanau) is 14.1 bits, while Pisces provides close
to optimal anonymity at 14.76 bit. For uniform probability
distributions, this represents an increase in the size of the
anonymity set by a factor of 1.6. It is also interesting to see
that the advantage of using Pisces increases as the number of
attack edge increases. To further investigate this, we consider
the attack model with perfect Sybil defense and vary the
number of attack edges. Figure 10(b) depicts the anonymity
as a function of the number of attack edges. We can see
that at 60 000 attack edges, the expected anonymity without
defenses is 7.5 bits, as compared to more than 13 bits with
Pisces (anonymity set size increases by a factor of 45).
Comparison with ShadowWalker: ShadowWalker [37] is
a state-of-the-art approach for scalable anonymous commu-
nication that organizes nodes into a structured topology such
as Chord and performs secure random walks on such topolo-
gies. We now compare our approach with ShadowWalker.
To compute the anonymity provided by ShadowWalker, we
use the fraction f of malicious nodes in the system as an
input to the analytic model of ShadowWalker [37], and use
ShadowWalker parameters that provide maximum security.
Figure 11(a) depicts the comparative results between Pisces
(using l = 25) and ShadowWalker. We can see that Pisces
significantly outperforms ShadowWalker. At g = 1000 attack
edges, Pisces provides about two bits higher entropy than
ShadowWalker, and this difference increases to six bits at
g = 3000 attack edges1. This difference arises because
Pisces directly performs random walks on the social net-
work topology, limiting the impact of Sybil attackers, while
ShadowWalker is designed to secure random walks only on
structured topologies. Arranging nodes in a structured topol-
ogy loses information about trust relationships between users,
resulting in poor anonymity for ShadowWalker. 2 For com-
parison, we also consider the attack model with perfect Sybil
defense and vary the number of attack edges. Figure 11(b)
depicts the results for this scenario. We can see that even
in this scenario where trust relationships lose meaning since
the adversary is randomly distributed, Pisces continues to
provides comparable anonymity to ShadowWalker. Pisces’s
entropy is slightly lower since social networks are slower
mixing than structured networks, requiring longer length
random walks than ShadowWalker and thereby giving more
observation points to the adversary.
Performance optimization: We now analyze the anony-
mity provided by our two hop optimization, which uses the
k-th hop and the last hop of the random walk for anonymous
communication. To analyze anonymity in this scenario, let us
redefine Mi (i 6= k) as the event when the first compromised
node is at the i-th hop, the last node is also compromised, but
the k-th node is honest. Let Mk be the event where the k-th
hop and the last hop are compromised (regardless of whether
other nodes are compromised or not) and the definition of
Ml remains the same as before, i.e., only the last hop is
compromised. We can compute system anonymity as:
H(I|O) =
i=k−1∑
i=1
P (Mi) ·H(I|Mi) +
l∑
i=k+1
P (Mi) ·H(I|Mk)
+ (1 −
i=l∑
i=1
P (Mi)) · log2 n (17)
Figure 12 depicts the anonymity for our two hop optimiza-
tion for different choices of k. We see an interesting trade-off
here. Small values of k are not optimal, since even though
the first hop is more likely to be honest, when the last hop
is compromised, then the initiator is easily localized. On the
1At such high attack edges, ShadowWalker may even have difficulty in
securely maintaining its topology, which could further lower anonymity.
2This observation is also applicable to Tor. Pisces provides 5 bits higher
entropy than Tor at g = 3000 attack edges.
(a) (b)
Fig. 10. Entropy as a function of fraction of attack edges using (a) realistic model of an imperfect Sybil defense (10 Sybils per attack edge) and (b)
perfect Sybil defense for Facebook wall post interaction graph. Note that the ”No Defense” strategy models the random walks used in systems such as
Drac and Whanau.
(a) (b)
Fig. 11. Comparison with ShadowWalker. Entropy as a function of fraction of attack edges using (a) realistic model of an imperfect Sybil defense (10
Sybils per attack edge) and (b) perfect Sybil defense for Facebook wall post interaction graph.
Fig. 12. Anonymity using the two hop performance optimization, Facebook
wall graph, 10 Sybils/attack edge. k = 12 results in provides a good trade-
off between anonymity and performance.
other hand, large values of k are also not optimal, since these
nodes are far away from the initiator in the trust graph and
are less trusted. We find that optimal trade-off points are in
the middle, with k = 12 providing the best anonymity for our
optimization. We also note that the anonymity provided by
our two hop optimization is close to the anonymity provided
by using all 25 hops of the random walk.
Selective denial of service: Next, we evaluate Pisces
anonymity against the selective DoS attack [5]. In this attack,
an adversary can cause a circuit to selectively fail whenever
he or she is unable to learn the initiator identity. This forces
the user to construct another circuit, which results in a
degradation of anonymity. We found that the degradation in
initiator anonymity under this attack is less than 1%. The
reason why Pisces is less vulnerable to selective DoS as
compared with other systems such as Tor is due to the use
of social trust. With high probability, most random walks
traverse only the honest set of nodes. This result is illustrated
Fig. 13. Anonymity under the Selective DoS attack using the Facebook
wall graph, 10 Sybils/attack edge. Selective DoS has limited impact.
in Figure 13.
Multiple communication rounds: So far, we had lim-
ited our analysis to a single communication round. Next,
we analyze system anonymity over multiple communication
rounds. Let us suppose that in communication rounds 1 . . . z,
the adversary’s observations are O1 . . . Oz . Let us denote
a given node’s probability of being the initiator after z
communication rounds by P (I = i|O1, . . . , Oz). Now, after
communication round z + 1, we are interested in computing
the probability P (I = i|O1, . . . , Oz+1). Using Bayes’s
theorem, we have that:
P (I = i|O1, . . . , Oz+1) =
P (O1, . . . , Oz+1|I = i) · P (I = i)
P (O1, . . . , Oz+1)
(18)
The key advantage of this formulation is that we can now
leverage the observations O1, . . . Oz+1 being independent
Fig. 14. Anonymity degradation over multiple communication rounds,
Facebook wall graph, 10 Sybils/attack edge
given a choice of initiator. Thus we have that:
P (I = i|O1, . . . , Oz+1) =
Πj=z+1j=1 P (Oj |I = i) · P (I = i)
P (O1, . . . , Oz+1)
=
Πj=z+1j=1 P (Oj |I = i) · P (I = i)∑p=h
p=1 P (O1, . . . , Oz+1|I = p) · P (I = p)
=
Πj=z+1j=1 P (Oj |I = i) · P (I = i)∑p=h
p=1 Π
j=z+1
j=1 P (Oj |I = p) · P (I = p)
(19)
Finally, assuming a uniform prior over all possible initiators,
we have that:
P (I = i|O1, . . . , Oz+1) =
Πj=z+1j=1 P (Oj |I = i)∑p=h
p=1 Π
j=z+1
j=1 P (Oj |I = p)
(20)
Figure 14 depicts the expected anonymity as a function
of number of communication rounds. We can see that the
entropy provided by Pisces outperforms conventional random
walks by more than a factor of two (in bits) after 100
communication rounds (the anonymity set size is increased
by a factor of 16).
V. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
While Pisces is the first decentralized design that can
both scalably leverage social network trust relationships and
mitigate route capture attacks, its architecture has some
limitations. First, Pisces requires user’s social contacts to
participate in the system. To improve the usability of the
system, in future work, we will investigate the feasibility
of leveraging a user’s two-hop social neighborhood in the
random walk process. Pisces also does not preserve the
privacy of users’ social contacts. We emphasize that this
is also a limitation shared by a large class of social net-
work based systems, including Sybil defense mechanisms
such as SybilLimit, SybilInfer and Whanau. Any distributed
anonymity system relying on such Sybil defense mechanisms
cannot preserve the privacy of users’ social contacts.
Second, users who are not well connected in the social
network topology may not benefit from using Pisces. This is
because random walks starting from those nodes may take
a very long time to converge to the stationary probability
distribution (which provides optimal anonymity).
Third, Pisces does not defend against targeted attacks on an
individual, in which the adversary aims to massively infiltrate
or compromise the user’s social circle for increasing the
probability of circuit compromise. We note that the impact
of such an attack is localized to the targeted individual.
Fourth, circuit establishment in Pisces has higher latency
than existing systems, since random walks in Pisces tend to
be longer. However, we note that circuits can be established
pre-emptively, such that this latency does not affect the user.
In fact, deployed systems such as Tor already build circuits
pre-emptively.
Finally, Pisces currently does not support important con-
straints such as bandwidth-based load balancing and exit
policies. The focus of our architecture was to secure the peer
discovery process in unstructured social network topologies,
and we will consider the incorporation of these constraints
in future work.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a mechanism for decentral-
ized anonymous communication that can securely leverage
a user’s trust relationships against a Byzantine adversary.
Our key contribution is to show that appearance of nodes
in each other’s neighbor lists can be made reciprocal in a
secure and efficient manner. Using theoretical analysis and
experiments on real world social network topologies, we
demonstrate that Pisces substantially reduces the probability
of active attacks on circuit constructions. We find that Pisces
significantly outperforms approaches that do not leverage
trust relationships, and provides up to six bits higher entropy
than ShadowWalker (5 bits higher entropy than Tor) in a
single communication round. Also, compared with the naive
strategy of using conventional random walks over social
networks (as in the Drac system), Pisces provides twice the
number of bits of entropy over 100 communication rounds.
In conclusion, we argue that the incorporation of social trust
will likely be an important consideration in the design of the
next generation of deployed anonymity systems.
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